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 Resource management with stochastic recharge
and environmental threats




Exploitation diminishes the capacity of renewable resources to with-
stand environmental stress, increasing their vulnerability to extreme
conditions that may trigger abrupt changes. The onset of such events
depends on the coincidence of extreme environmental conditions (en-
vironmental threat) and the resource state (determining its resilience).
When the former is uncertain and the latter evolves stochastically, the
uncertainty regarding the event occurrence is the result of the com-
bined e®ect of these two uncertain components. We analyzed optimal
resource management in such a setting. Existence of an optimal sta-
tionary policy is established and long run properties are characterized.
A numerical illustration based on actual data is presented.
Keywords: Stochastic stock dynamics, event uncertainty, Markov decision
process, optimal stationary policy.
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Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, POB 12, Rehovot 76100, Israel (tsur@agri.huji.ac.il).1 Introduction
We study management of renewable resources with a stochastic state evo-
lution and environmental uncertainty regarding the occurrence of an abrupt
catastrophic event. The e®ects on management policies of these two un-
certain processes are highly intertwined, as the vulnerability of a resource to
(uncertain) environmental stress depends critically on its (stochastic) state.
Admittedly, numerous uncertain elements prevail in any given resource sit-
uation and the literature addresses many of them (see Pindyck 2007, for a
survey). But the combined e®ect of stochastic state evolution and uncertain
abrupt events has not been addressed so far.
The economic literature on natural resources with stochastic state dynam-
ics (e.g., Burt 1964, Reed 1974, Pindyck 1984, 2002, Knapp and Olson 1995,
Costello et al. 2001, Singh et al. 2006, Mitra and Roy 2006, Wirl 2007, and ref-
erences they cite) mostly ignores uncertain catastrophic events such as abrupt
regime shift or ecological collapse.1 The sudden occurrence of such events is
related to nonlinear phenomena such as positive feedbacks, hysteresis and the
presence of uncertain thresholds that are prevalent in environmental processes
(Dasgupta and MÄ aler 2003, Brock and Starrett 2003). Examples include
pollution-induced catastrophes (Cropper 1976, Clarke and Reed 1994, Aron-
sson et al. 1998, Tsur and Zemel 1998), a sudden collapse of an ecosystem
or of animal and plant populations (Reed 1989, Tsur and Zemel 1994, Brock
and Xepapadeas 2003), destruction of coastal aquifers due to seawater intru-
sion (Tsur and Zemel 1995, 2004), phosphorus loading into lakes inducing an
1Some of these works incorporate thresholds, e.g., project investment thresholds in
Pindyck (2002), extinction thresholds in Mitra and Roy (2006) and temperature thresh-
olds in Wirl (2007), but these thresholds are deterministic and the uncertainty emanates
only from the stochastic stock dynamics.
1irreversible transition from oligotrophic (clear) state into a eutrophic (turbid)
state (Harper 1992, Carpenter et al. 1999, MÄ aler 2000), and global warming
induced catastrophes (Tsur and Zemel 1996, 2009, Broecker 1997, Mastran-
drea and Schneider 2001, Alley et al. 2003, N½vdal 2006, Haurie and Moresino
2006, Roe and Baker 2007, Stern 2007, Bahn et al. 2008, Weitzman 2009).2
This literature strain assumes a deterministic evolution of the resource state.
The most pronounced e®ect on resource management policies of the pres-
ence of a catastrophic threat shows up in the discount factor, which becomes
policy-dependent, i.e., endogenous. Implications of this property for climate
policies under threats of global warming induced catastrophes have recently
been studied (see, e.g., Tsur and Zemel 2008, 2009) in a deterministic resource
evolution framework. Here we consider stochastic state dynamics in a general
renewable resource situation. The endogeneity of the discount factor requires
extending some properties of Markov decision processes that are known to
hold under constant discounting (see, e.g., Puterman 2005).
The resource setup, with the stochastic state dynamics and the environ-
mental threat, is formulated in Section 2. Section 3 formulates the man-
agement problem. Existence of an optimal stationary policy under policy-
dependent discount factor is established in Section 4. Long-run (steady state)
behavior under the optimal policy is characterized in Section 5. A numerical
illustration, based on actual data, is presented in Section 6. Section 7 con-
cludes and the appendix describes the algorithm used to calculate the optimal
policy, value and steady state distribution of the numerical example.
2The abrupt change may be desirable, as in Bahn et al. (2008) who consider two such
events: the resolution of uncertainty regarding climate sensitivity and technological break-
through regarding a carbon-free energy source.
22 Resource setup
We formulate the rules governing the evolution of the resource state under
the uncertain environmental event.
2.1 States, actions and recharge





t is the m'th stock, m = 1;2;:::;M. The resource evolves in time
according to
St+1 = St + R(St) + Xt ¡ gt; t = 1;2;:::; (2.1)
where R(St) = (R1(St);R2(St);:::;RM(St))0, Xt = (X1
t ;X2
t ;:::;XM




t )0 are M-dimensional vectors representing deterministic recharge,
stochastic recharge and exploitation (harvest, extraction) rates, respectively.
We consider discrete (¯nite or countable) state, recharge and action spaces,
denoted S, X and A, respectively. Thus, S = fs1;s2;:::;snsg, where sj 2
IR
M; j = 1;2;:::;ns and ns (possibly in¯nite) is the number of states.
Let Am(s) consists of stock m's actions (exploitation rates) feasible at state
s 2 S and let A(s) = A1(s)£A2(s)£¢¢¢£AM(s). The admissible action space
is A =
S
s2S A(s) = fa1;a2;:::;anag, where aj 2 IR
M and na is the number of
actions (¯nite or countable). An action gt = (g1
t;g2
t;:::;gM
t )0 corresponds to
exploiting (harvesting, extracting) source m at the rate gm
t ; m = 1;2;:::;M;
during time period t. The action is feasible if gt 2 A(St).
In a similar manner we let X m(s) represent the support of stock m's
recharge distribution at state s 2 S and de¯ne X(s) = X 1(s) £ X 2(s) £
¢¢¢ £ X m(s). The admissible support is X =
S
s2S X(s) = fx1;x2;:::;xnxg,
containing nx (possibly in¯nite) feasible recharge vectors xj 2 IR
M
+ . The
3recharge probability at time t, given St = s, is denoted pxjs(¢), i.e.,
pxjs(x) ´ PrfR(St) + Xt = xjSt = sg: (2.2)
2.2 Environmental threat
The resource system is under risk of an abrupt shock (regime shift) with
undesirable consequences. The conditions that trigger such events depend on
the resource state and exploitation policy and are uncertain due to genuine
environmental uncertainty or due to our own lack of complete understanding
of the processes that lead to occurrence of the event or both. Let · denote
the catastrophic state of the resource system and let 1¡¸(s;a) be the hazard
probability to end up in · at time t + 1 when occupying state s 6= · and
employing action a at time t. Let T denote the time period at which the
event occurs. Then,
PrfT = ¿g = [1 ¡ ¸(S¿;g¿)]
¿¡1 Y
j=1
¸(Sj;gj); ¿ = 1;2:::; (2.3)
where we use the convention that
Q¿¡1
j=1 = 1 for ¿ = 1.
The event occurrence probability (2.3) represents the environmental un-
certainty conditional on the resource state trajectory and exploitation policy.
The combined e®ect of the event uncertainty and the stochastic evolution of
the resource state shows up in the resource transition probabilities, speci¯ed
next.
2.3 Transition probabilities
Let p(jji;a) represent the probability of occupying state sj at time t + 1
conditional on St = si, gt = a and T > t (i.e., that the event will not interrupt):
p(jji;a) = PrfSt+1 = sjjSt = si;gt = a;T > tg:
4In view of (2.1)-(2.2),
p(jji;a) = pxjsi(sj ¡ si + a): (2.4)
We let Pa represent the ns £ ns matrix with p(jji;a) as the (i;j) element.
Given the the event has not occurred by time t¡1, the probability during
time t of moving from si to sj and of nonoccurrence is
q(jji;a) ´ PrfSt+1 = sj;T > tjSt = si;gt = ag
= PrfSt+1 = sjjSt = si;gt = a;T > tgPrfT > tjT > t ¡ 1;St = si;gt = ag
= p(jji;a)¸(si;a): (2.5)
We denote by Qa the ns £ns matrix with the (i;j) element given by q(jji;a).
3 Management policies and welfare
We begin by formulating the instantaneous rewards and payo®s. The
decision rules and policies are explained next and subsection 3.3 presents the
welfare criterion.
3.1 Rewards and payo®s
If the event does not occur during time period t, while the resource is at
state St and the action gt is undertaken, the instantaneous reward ~ b(St;gt) is
obtained, whereas if the event occurs the post-event value vp(St) is acquired.
The latter represents the present-value, under the optimal post-event policy, of
the bene¯t °ow from the occurrence time onwards, discounted to the beginning
of the occurrence period. We assume that ~ b(s;a) and vp(s) are bounded
and that the latter is smaller than the pre-event value (de¯ned below), as we
consider undesirable events.








































By changing the order of summation (permitted when ~ b is bounded), the ¯rst







































This expression is the present value of the bene¯t °ow ~ b(St;gt) discounted with
the policy-dependent discount factor
°(t) =
(
1 t = 1
Qt¡1
j=1 ¯¸(Sj;gj) t = 2;3;::::
(3.5)
The function °(t) is the compound discount factor corresponding to the run-
ning (single period) discount factor ¯¸(St;gt).




p(St)[1 ¡ ¸(St;gt)]°(t): (3.6)
Combining (3.4) and (3.6), the expectation of the payo® with respect to event





b(St;gt) ´ ~ b(St;gt) + v
p(St)[1 ¡ ¸(St;gt)]: (3.8)
The catastrophic environmental threat a®ects the payo® in two ways: ¯rst,
by changing the instantaneous bene¯t from ~ b(St;gt) to b(St;gt); second, by
changing the discount factor from the constant ¯ to the state-and-action-
dependent discount factor ¯¸(St;gt). The latter e®ect is twofold: ¯rst, it
decreases the discount factor (¯¸(s;a) · ¯ since ¸(s;a) · 1), thereby induc-
ing less conservation (since the future is discounted more heavily); second, it
turns the discount factor endogenous to the exploitation policy. The policy
implications of these e®ects were studied in a deterministic state evolution
model of climate change induced catastrophes (e.g., Tsur and Zemel 2008,
2009). Here we consider stochastic state evolution.
3.2 Decision rules and policies
A decision rule dt(¢) determines the action at time t given the available
information fSt;St¡1;St¡2:::g;fgt¡1;gt¡2;:::g. It may be history-dependent or
Markovian (depends only on the current state St), randomized or determinis-
tic. Consequently, the four types of decision rules are history-dependent and
randomized (HR), history-dependent and deterministic (HD), Markovian and
7randomized (MR), Markovian and deterministic (MD). A policy (or plan)
speci¯es the decision rules for all time periods, ¼ = fd1;d2;:::g, and is clas-
si¯ed as HR, HD, MR or MD depending on the type of the decision rules
dt; t = 1;2;:::. A policy is stationary if the same decision rule is repeated in
all time periods, i.e., dt(¢) = '(¢) 8t. (Thus, a stationary policy is necessarily
Markovian.)
The HR class of policies is the widest and contains all other classes as
special cases, while the MD class is contained in all other classes. Within the
MD class, stationary policies are the simplest, hence are attractive for actual
implementations.
3.3 Welfare
Under a Markovian policy ¼ = fd1;d2;:::g, with gt = dt(St), the (random)



















¼(s); s 2 S: (3.10)
4 Optimal policy
The optimal policy ¼¤, when exists, satis¯es v¼¤(s) = v¤(s) for all s 2 S.
We denote by v'(s) the value corresponding to the stationary policy ¼ =
(';';¢¢¢). As stationary MD policies are attractive for implementation pur-
poses, it is of interest to know if the value v¤ can be attained by such a policy.
8Under a constant discount factor (and some regularity conditions), the answer
is in the a±rmative (see Puterman 2005, Chapter 6). We show that this
property is retained with endogenous (policy-dependent) discount factor and,
along the way, characterize the optimal stationary policy. We begin with
some de¯nitions and notation.
Recall that without the catastrophic threat, i.e., when the survival proba-
bility ¸(s;a) = 1 for all s 2 S and a 2 A, the discount factor is constant and









; i = 1;2;:::;ns;




where v = (v(s1);:::;v(sns))0, a = (a1;:::;ans) 2 A(s1) £ ¢¢¢ £ A(sns) = A(s),
ba = (b(s1;a1);:::;b(sns;ans))0 and Pa is the ns £ ns matrix with the (i;j) ele-
ment given by p(jji;a). In the presence of environmental threat, the discount










; i = 1;2;:::;ns;
(4.1)
or in matrix notation
v = max
a2A
fba + ¯Qavg; (4.2)
where Qa is an ns£ns matrix with (i;j) element given by ¸(si;a)p(jji;a) (the
i'th row of Qa equals ¸(si;a) times the i'th row of Pa).
Let V be the space of bounded functions on S endowed with the supremum









; i = 1;2;:::;ns;
or in matrix notation
L(v) = max
a2A
fba + ¯Qavg: (4.3)
The optimality equations can be expressed in terms of L as
v(si) = L(v)i; i = 1;2;:::;ns;
or in matrix notation as
v = L(v): (4.4)
We now establish:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that (A1) 0 · ¯ < 1, (A2) S is discrete (¯nite or
countable), (A3) ~ b : S £ A 7! IR and vp : S 7! IR are bounded and (A4)
~ b(si;a) and ¸(si;a)p(jji;a) are continuous in a, and A(si) is compact for all
si;sj 2 S. Then:
(i) the optimal value v¤ is the unique ¯xed point of (4:4);
(ii) a stationary policy ' is optimal if and only if the actions ai = '(si); i =
1;2;:::;ns; realize the maxima in (4:1);
(iii) there exists an optimal, Markovian-Deterministic stationary policy '¤,




¤(s) 8s 2 S: (4.5)
Proof. Assumptions (A3)-(A4) ensure that the maxima in (4.1) are attained.
For a given v 2 V , let ai(v); i = 1;2;:::;ns, denote the actions where the








; i = 1;2;:::;ns;
which together with





L(v)i ¡ L(u)i · ¯¸(si;ai(v))
ns X
j=1
p(jji;ai(v))(vj ¡ uj); i = 1;2;:::;ns: (4.6)
Since
Pns
j=1 p(jji;ai(v)) = 1, we conclude from (4.6) that
L(v)i ¡ L(u)i · ¯¸(si;ai(v))max
j
jvj ¡ ujj; i = 1;2;:::;ns:
Since ¯¸(si;ai(v)) · ¯ < 1, we can further conclude that
max
i
fL(v)i ¡ L(u)ig · ¯ max
j
jvj ¡ ujj:
Interchanging in the above inequality the roles of u and v we obtain
max
i
jL(v)i ¡ L(u)ij · ¯ max
j
jvj ¡ ujj: (4.7)
It follows from (4.7) and (A1) that L is a contraction, implying the existence
of a unique ¯xed point of (4.4). Denote this ¯xed point by ~ v. We next show
that ~ v = v¤.
Let a¤
i; i = 1;2;:::;ns; be the actions that realize the maxima in (4.1), and
de¯ne '¤(si) = a¤
i. Then,






¤(si))~ v(sj); si 2 S; (4.8)
or in vector notation
~ v = b'¤ + ¯Q'¤~ v; (4.9)
11where b'¤ = (b(s1;'¤(s1));:::;b(sns;'¤(sns)))0 and Q'¤ is the ns £ ns matrix
with the (i;j) element given by ¸(si;'¤(si))p(jji;'¤(si)).
Evaluating (4.8) at time t, with si = St and gt = '¤(St), gives











t ~ v(St+1); (4.10)
where E
'¤
t denotes expectation under the gt = '¤(St) decision rule conditional
on the information available at time t (which includes St). Multiplying (4.10)











t ~ v(St+1): (4.11)
Since °'¤(t + 1) depends only on information available at time t, the second











(t + 1)~ v(St+1)
¤












(t + 1)~ v(St+1)
¤
:














(t + 1)~ v(St+1):












(¿ + 1)~ v(S¿+1): (4.12)









(t) = ~ v(S1); (4.13)
where we use the property that si 7! ~ v(si), si 2 S, is a bounded function,
namely ~ v is a bounded solution of (4.2), which is guaranteed by (A3).
For an arbitrary policy '(¢) we can repeat the above derivation with in-
equalities rather than equalities, obtaining










'(t) · ~ v(S1)
instead of (4.13). It follows that '?(s) is an optimal policy and ~ v(s) = v¤(s),
establishing claims (i) and (ii) of the theorem. As indicated above, the only
condition for the existence of '¤(¢) is that there exists a bounded solution for
(4.2), which follows from condition (A3) and claim (i), establishing (iii).
Puterman (2005, Chapter 6,) presents a variety of algorithms for calculat-
ing optimal stationary policies of Markov Decision Process (MDP) problems.
In the empirical example of Section 6 we calculate the optimal policy using an
algorithm based on Linear Programming (LP), adopted to the present case of
a state-dependent discount factor.
5 Long-run behavior
Recalling equations (2.4)-(2.5), P'¤(i;j) = p(jji;'¤(si)) gives the prob-
ability that the resource system moves from St = si to St+1 = sj when
13the optimal policy gt = '¤(si) is employed, conditional on the event not






¤(si)); i = 1;2;:::;ns: (5.1)
The transition matrix P'¤ is aperiodic, thus classi¯es each state as either
recurrent or transient. The recurrent states can be arranged in K irreducible
subsets Ek; k = 1;2;:::;K.3 Recurrent, irreducible subsets are absorbing, i.e.,
once the state process enters Ek it stays there forever. We let nk represent
the number of elements (states) in Ek and denote by Pk the nk£nk submatrix
of P'¤ corresponding to the states contained in Ek; k = 1;2;:::;K.
We call the state si \safe" or \unsafe" depending on whether ¸¤
i = 1 or
¸¤
i < 1, respectively. The subset
S1 = fsi 2 Sj¸
¤
i = 1g (5.2)
contains all \safe" states. (S1 may well be empty.)
If Ek contains no \unsafe" states, i.e., Ek µ S1, then entering Ek ensures
that the event will never occur. This is so because the probability that the
event will occur during period t given St = si 2 Ek is 1 ¡ ¸¤
i = 0 for any
si 2 Ek and Ek is absorbing. For recurrent, irreducible sets containing only
\safe" states we de¯ne the limiting matrix4





The (i;j) element of ^ Pk represents the probability that in the long run the
system will occupy state sj when it starts at state si and the optimal policy
3The subset Ek ½ S is closed if PrfSt+¿ = sjjSt = si;'¤(¢)g = 0 for any si 2 Ek and
sj = 2 Ek, ¿ = 1;2;:::. The subset Ek is irreducible if no proper subset of it is closed.
4The limit exists since Pk is aperiodic.
14is employed for any si;sj 2 Ek. Clearly, ^ Pk satis¯es Pk ^ Pk = ^ Pk (taking one
extra step cannot change the limiting behavior), implying that ^ Pk has identical
rows ^ p 0






qj = 1: (5.4)
The nk-vector ^ pk constitutes the steady-state distribution of the nk states
contained in Ek µ S1, provided the optimal state process begins at (or enters
after a ¯nite time) Ek.
If Ek * S1 (i.e., Ek contains at least one \unsafe" state su, say), then
entering Ek implies that the event will (eventually) occur with probability
one. This is so because each time the \unsafe" state su is visited an occurrence
probability of 1 ¡ ¸¤
u > 0 is in°icted and (once in Ek) visits to su never stops
prior to the event occurrence.5 It follows that the limiting probability of
si 2 Ek * S1 must vanish and the limiting probability of · (the occurrence
state) is one.
We summarize the above discussion in:
Proposition 5.1. The optimal state process either initiates at or enters after
a ¯nite (transient state) period one of the recurrent, irreducible subsets Ek
(provided the event has not occurred during the transient state period).
(i) If Ek µ S1, then (a) the long run (steady state) probability of states in Ek
is given by ^ pk, de¯ned in (5.4), (b) the long run probability of states not in Ek
vanish, and (c) the event occurrence probability is zero.
5Suppose, without loss of generality, that su is the only \unsafe" state in Ek and notice
that, unless interrupted by the event, the recurrent state su will be visited in¯nite number
of times with probability one. Occurrence may happen on the ¯rst visit with probability
1 ¡ ¸¤
u or on the second visit with probability ¸¤
u(1 ¡ ¸¤
u) or on the third visit with prob-
ability ¸¤2
u (1 ¡ ¸¤






15(ii) If Ek * S1, then (a) the long run (steady state) probability of all states in
S vanish, and (b) the long run occurrence probability (the limiting probability
of the occurrence state ·) is 1.
6 Empirical illustration
The Kinneret water basin (Lake Kinneret is also known as the Sea of
Galilee) is the largest of Israel's natural water sources, providing about 40
percent of the country's annual natural water supply on average. Lake Kin-
neret is a shallow lake, with maximal and average water depths of 46 m and
25 m, respectively (Gvirtzman 2002, p. 34). Like other shallow lakes (Harper
1992, MÄ aler 2000), it faces a risk of abrupt ecosystem collapse due to pollution
and eutrophication processes (Gvirtzman 2002, pp. 43-55). The risk of such
abrupt regime-shift depends on the lake's water head (stock). This property,
together with the highly volatile recharge process (Figure 1), render the above
framework particularly suitable for studying optimal management policies.
In the next subsection we describe the basin's recharge process and derive
its distribution. Subsection 6.2 de¯nes states and actions and subsection
6.3 derives the ensuing transition probabilities. The rewards are speci¯ed in
subsection 6.4, paying special attention to the catastrophic threat associated
with over-exploitation. In subsection 6.5 we apply an algorithm based on
Linear Programming (LP) for solving Markov decision Processes (MDPs) and
derive the optimal policy and value (the algorithm is brie°y described the
appendix). Finally, the steady state distribution under the optimal policy is
calculated in subsection 6.6.
166.1 Recharge process
Figure 1 presents the Kinneret's net (accounting for evaporation) annual
recharge for the period 1932 - 2008.6 We use the gamma distribution to ap-
proximate the recharge distribution, i.e., we assume that the recharge series
consists of iid draws from a gamma distribution with parameters ® and µ,
satisfying
®µ = Mean(recharge) - Min(recharge) = 570:38 ¡ 157 = 413:38 MCMY
and
®µ
2 = Var(recharge) = 77333:8;
where MCMY stands for million m3 per year (the mean, min and standard
deviation of the recharge series are displayed in Figure 1). We obtain ® =
2:20967 and µ = 187:077. Figure 2 depicts the empirical distribution of the




The support of the recharge distribution is denoted X = fx1;x2;:::;xnxg,
with x1 = 150 MCMY (the minimal recharge realization { see Figure 1),
xnx = 1450 MCMY (approximately the maximal recharge realization) and
x`+1 ¡ x` = ¢x; ` = 1;2;:::;nx ¡ 1. Thus,
x` = 150 + (` ¡ 1)¢x; ` = 1;2;:::;nx; (6.1)
6The help of Miki Zaide, Avihai Hadad and Amir Givati, of Israel's Water Authority, in
making the data available for our use is gratefully acknowledged.





F(x` + ¢x=2) if ` = 1
F(x` + ¢x=2) ¡ F(x` ¡ ¢x=2) if 2 · ` · nx ¡ 1
1 ¡ F(x` ¡ ¢x=2) if ` = nx
(6.2)
where F(¢) is the gamma distribution speci¯ed above (and depicted in Figure
2). Since nx and ¢x are related according to xnx = x1+(nx¡1)¢x, setting one
parameter determines the other. Setting ¢x = 50 MCMY implies nx = 15.
6.2 States and actions
The Kinneret water-head ranges between the altitudes 208.8 and 215 meter
below sea level (¡208:8 m and ¡215 m, respectively). Above the upper water-
head (¡208:8 m) the water over°ows the lake's edges (°ooding is avoided by
opening the gates of the Degania dam at the southern outlet of the lake leading
into the lower Jordan river). The lower altitude (-215 m) is the minimal water
head level at which water can be pumped (due to pumping infrastructure) and
is designated as the black line.7 In between there is the so-called red line {
an imaginary water-head level indicating a critical water stock below which
the above-mentioned catastrophic risk increases sharply. The red line is set
at -213 m.8
The water stock corresponding to the black line is normalized at zero and
each meter of water-head above the black line is equivalent to 165 - 170 million
m3 (MCM).9 A water state corresponds to the water stock above the black
line, so s = 0 when the water-head level is at -215 m, s = 300 MCM when the
water head is at the red line (-213 m) and s = ¹ s = 1000 when the water-head
7The exact minimal water head from which pumping is feasible is -214.87 m and we
round it to -215 m.
8The red line has been modi¯ed in the past in response to pressure to increase pumping
during dry years (see Gvirtzman 2002, p. 36).
9The range is due to di®erences in the surface of the lake at di®erent water levels.
18level is at -208.8 m. The admissible state set is S = fs1;s2;:::;snsg, where
the sj's are evenly spread apart. Setting sj+1 ¡ sj ´ ¢s = 50 MCM gives
ns = 21 states.
An action a corresponds to pumping a million m3 per year (MCMY). The
admissible action set is A = fa1;a2;:::;anag with a1 = 0, ana = 700 MCMY
(determined by the existing pumping infrastructure) and aj+1 ¡aj = ¢a; j =
1;2;:::;na ¡ 1. Setting ¢a = 50 MCMY implies na = 15.
A time period (a year) in the present case begins at the end of the rainy
season (the bulk of the rain in Israel's Mediterranean weather occurs during
the months of November through April) while water extraction occurs mostly
during the dry season (May - October). It is therefore not feasible to extract
more than the water stock available at the beginning of the period, i.e., given
the water stock St at the beginning of period t, gt · St. Thus, A(St) = fak 2
Ajak · Stg. At the end of the dry season, the water stock will reach the
level St ¡gt ¸ 0 and this level a®ects the catastrophic hazard, as explained in
subsection 6.4.
6.3 Transition probabilities
The transition probabilities, conditional on nonoccurrence, are
p(jji;ak) = PrfSt+1 = sjjSt = si;gt = akg
= PrfR(St) + Xt = sj ¡ si + akg
= pxjs(sj ¡ si + akg; j;i = 1;2;:::;ns; k = 1;2;:::;na; (6.3)
where pxjs(¢) is de¯ned in (6.2).
196.4 Instantaneous bene¯t
The immediate reward at time t, speci¯ed in (3.8), is repeated here for
convenience:
b(St;gt) = ~ b(St;gt) + v
p(St)[1 ¡ ¸(St;gt)]:
The ¯rst term on the right-hand side is the bene¯t enjoyed during non-occurrence
periods; the second term is the bene¯t under the interrupting regime-shift,
namely the post-event value weighted by the occurrence probability. The for-
mer consists of the surplus water users (irrigators, households, industry) derive
from the pumped water gt net of the supply cost (extraction, conveyance, treat-
ment, distribution); the latter stems from the forgone bene¯t associated with
not being able to use the lake for a prolong period of time. We discuss each
in turn.
6.4.1 Immediate bene¯ts during non-occurrence periods
Let D(¢) denote the inverse demand facing the Kinneret's water, i.e., at a
water price $D(a) per million m3 (MCM) the water demand is a million m3
per year (MCMY). Let C(a) represent the cost of supplying a MCMY. The





Assuming that the derived demand for water is inversely related to the
water price, i.e., D(a) = c1=a, and that C(a) = c2a, the net consumer surplus
becomes
~ b(s;a) = c1 ln(a) ¡ c2a; (6.4)
where c1 is a positive demand parameter and c2 is the unit cost of water supply.
20Assuming further that at a price of $0:5 £ 106 per MCM ($0.5 per m3) the
water demand is 600 MCMY implies c1 = 300 £ 106. The unit cost of supply
is taken at $0:2 £ 106 per MCM (c2 = 0:2 £ 106).
6.4.2 Post-event value and occurrence probability
We consider the case in which the event (the abrupt regime shift) renders
the lake's water unusable for a very long period and take the post-event value
vp to represent the forgone consumer surplus (i.e., the bene¯t water users could
derive had the regime shift been prevented) as well as ecological damages and
loss of recreational opportunities. We estimate this forgone value by the
present value of constant °ow ~ b(s;a) evaluated at a = 550 MCMY (which
is about the average recharge). Thus, with the discount factor ¯ = 0:9434
(corresponding to 6% interest rate) and the above speci¯cation of ~ b,
v
p = ¡~ b(s;550)=(1 ¡ ¯) t ¡3 £ 10
10:
The survival probability ¸(St;gt) equals one if St ¡ gt (the minimal water
stock during time period t) does not fall below the critical water stock sc = 300
MCM corresponding to the red line. As soon as the water-head drops below
the red line, the survival probability decreases and reaches ¸(0) = ¸0 ¸ 0




¸0 + (1 ¡ ¸0)expf±(s ¡ a ¡ sc)=(s ¡ a)g if s ¡ a < sc
1 if s ¡ a ¸ sc
(6.5)
where ± is a (positive) shape parameter. Indeed for a = s, exploitation brings
the water stock to the black line and ¸(s;s) = ¸0.
The immediate bene¯t specializes to
b(s;a) = c1 ln(a)¡c2a+v
p(1¡¸0)maxf1¡exp[±(s¡a¡sc)=(s¡a)];0g: (6.6)
21The function speci¯cations and parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
6.5 Optimal policy and value
We calculate the optimal policy using an algorithm based on Linear Pro-
gramming (LP). Appendix A describes the algorithm and its application in the
present case. The algorithm provides the optimal policy '¤(si); i = 1;2;:::;ns,
depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3
Noting (4.9) and ~ v = v¤, the value v¤ = (v¤(s1);:::;v¤(sns))0 is calculated
by
v
¤ = (I ¡ ¯Q'¤)
¡1b'¤; (6.7)
where b'¤ = (b(s1;'¤(s1));:::;b(sns;'¤(sns))0 and Q'¤ is the ns £ ns matrix




From the optimal extraction policy in Figure 3 we conclude that there is
one recurrent, irreducible subset E1 = f450;500;:::;1000g, and all states below
450 MCM are transient. This is so because the optimal extraction policy is
such that it is not optimal to intentionally drop the water stock below 300
MCM (the red line) at the end of the dry season, and the minimal recharge
(during the rainy season) is 150 MCMY. Thus, at the end of the year the
22water stock will be at or above 450 MCM. Water stocks (at the end of the
rainy season) below 450 can only be encountered initially and for a limited
number of periods (until recharge increases the stock), hence are transient.10
The ¸¤
j data of Figure 3 reveal that E1 contains only \safe" states (¸¤
i = 1
for all si 2 E1). Thus, once the optimal state process enters E1 the event will
never occur (the environmental threat is removed).
The steady state probabilities, characterized in Proposition 5.1 and applied
with the above E1, are depicted in Figure 5. In the long run (steady state),
under the optimal policy, the stock never drops below 450 MCM (the red line,
below which the environmental threat is activated, is at 300 MCM). This
allows pumping at least 150 MCMY without drawing the water head below
the red line (recall that the water head at the end of the dry season reaches
St ¡ gt), thereby providing a bu®er against bad draws (dry years).
Figure 5














¤(sj) = 494:211 MCMY:
If the recharge were stable at the mean ¹ x = 570:38 MCMY (see Figure
1), the steady-state extraction were set at this rate and this policy could have
been maintained at a much lower stock level, e.g., at 300 MCM corresponding
to the threshold stock (the red line water-head level). The higher (average)
10This state classi¯cation can be reached also by applying the procedure described in
Puterman (2005, p. 590) on the transition matrix P'¤.
23stock constitutes a bu®er that allows mitigating extraction °uctuations, in
spite of the stochastically °uctuating recharge, by drawing down the stock
during bad (low recharge) years and ¯lling it up during good (high recharge)
years. On average, extractions are slightly less than the average recharge
(494 MCMY vs. 570 MCMY), while under the steady state distribution the






^ qj['¤(sj) ¡ ^ g]2 = 117:225;
is substantially smaller than the recharge process' standard deviation of 278.09
(see Figure 1). The latter owes to the bu®er role of the water stock (this e®ect
is similar to, though not the same as, the bu®er value proposed by Tsur and
Graham-Tomasi 1991).
The large lung-run probability of the full capacity stock (the steady-state
probability of s = 1000 MCM is about 1/3, implying that, under the opti-
mal policy, in the long run the lake should be ¯lled up every third winter
on average) is an outcome of the policy of maintaining a large average stock
(as a bu®er against a series of dry years). Thus, it pays to let more water
°ow into the lower Jordan river (by opening the gates of Degania dam at the
lake's southern outlet during rainy years) in order to have the bu®er stock
available during dry years. We note that this property is linked to the particu-
lar speci¯cations and parameter values of Table 1, set for illustration purpose
only.
7 Concluding comments
Exploitation has diminished the capacity of many renewable resources to
endure stress, increasing their vulnerability to extreme environmental condi-
24tions that may trigger abrupt changes. The onset of such events depends on
the coincidence of extreme environmental conditions and the resource state.
Typically, both elements are uncertain and the uncertainty associated with the
event occurrence is the result of their combined e®ect. We analyzed resource
management in such a setting.
The environmental threat a®ects management policies in two ways: ¯rst,
it changes the immediate bene¯t °ow; second, it turns the discount factor en-
dogenous to the exploitation policy. These e®ects were studied in a variety
of resource management problems under a deterministic state evolution (e.g.,
Clarke and Reed 1994, Tsur and Zemel 1996, 2008, 2009, Aronsson et al. 1998,
Haurie and Moresino 2006). Here they are investigated in resource situations
involving stochastic state evolution. Existence of an optimal stationary pol-
icy is established and long run properties are characterized. A numerical
illustration based on actual data is presented.
With some modi¯cations, the framework developed here can be extended
to accommodate models that combine resource exploitation and economic
growth, such as integrated assessment models of climate change. The evo-
lution of the various state variables in such models is all but stochastic and
threats of global warming induced catastrophes have become increasingly alarm-
ing (see Nordhaus 2008, Chapter 7). The present framework can be used to
incorporate both types of uncertainty in a coherent (non ad hoc) fashion.
25A Appendix: The LP algorithm for calculat-
ing optimal policies of MDPs
Puterman (2005, Chapter 6) presents a variety of algorithms for calcu-
lating optimal policies of Markov decision processes (MDPs). We use the
algorithm based on Linear Programming (LP), adopted to the present case of
a state-dependent discount factor. We brie°y describe the algorithm and its
application.
A.1 The LP approach for solving MDPs
The algorithm is based on the following property:
Proposition A.1. If v 2 V satis¯es v ¸ L(v), then v ¸ v¤.
Proof. The mapping L, de¯ned in (4.3), is monotonic, i.e., for v;u 2 V , v ¸ u
implies L(v) ¸ L(u). This property follows from ¯ ¸ 0 and Qa(i;j) ¸
0 8(i;j). Thus, v ¸ L(v) implies L(v) ¸ L(L(v)) ´ L2(v), hence v ¸ L(v)
implies v ¸ L2(v). Repeating this reasoning, we ¯nd that v ¸ L(V ) implies
v ¸ Lk(v) for k = 1;2;:::. Letting k ! 1, recalling that L is a contraction
and v¤ is the unique ¯xed point of v = L(v) (Theorem 4.1), establishes the
result.
It follows that the inequality v ¸ L(v), or in component notation
vi ¸ b(si;ak) + ¯¸(si;ak)
X
j
p(jji;ak)vj 8ak 2 A(si); i = 1;2;:::;ns;
can at best hold as equality, in which case v = v¤. This suggests the following
(primal) Linear Programming (LP) problem for ¯nding v¤:
Set ®j > 0; j = 1;2;:::;ns; satisfying
P
j ®j = 1 (any positive ®j will do but
26the requirement that they sum to one allows a probability interpretation) and








p(jji;ak)vj ¸ b(si;ak) 8ak 2 A(si); i = 1;2;:::;ns:
This LP problem has ns unknowns (columns) and
Pns
i=1 nai constraints (rows),
where nai is the number of actions in A(si).
The dual to the above LP problem is formulated as follows:














¯¸(si;ak)p(jji;ak)x(si;ak) = ®j; j = 1;2;:::;ns:
(A.2)
The dual LP has
Pns
i=1 nai unknowns (columns) and ns constraints (rows).
The number of constraints is smaller than that of the primal LP problem,
which renders the dual LP more tractable. Properties of the dual LP problem,
including a veri¯cation that a basic solution exists, are discussed in Puterman
(2005, pp. 223-231).
Let x¤(si;ak); i = 1;2;:::;ns; k = 1;2;:::;nai, denote the solution of the
dual LP. Since the dual LP has ns constraints, only ns out of the
Pns
i=1 nai
elements of x¤ are positive. Moreover, for any state si only one x¤(si;ak) > 0.






¤(si;ak) > 0)ak; i = 1;2;:::;ns; (A.3)
27where 1(¢) assumes the values 1 or 0 when its argument is true or false, re-
spectively.
A.2 LP speci¯cation in the present case
Let D(i;k) = 1 or 0 as si ¸ ak or si < ak, respectively. Thus, D(i;k) = 1
if the action ak is feasible at si and D(i;k) = 0 otherwise (see discussion in
subsection 6.2). Let B be the ns £ na matrix with the i;k element given by





























~ p(jji;k)x(i;k) = 1=ns; j = 1;2;:::;ns; (A.5)
where we set ®j = 1=ns; j = 1;2;:::;ns.
The LP problem then is to ¯nd x(i;k) ¸ 0; i = 1;2;:::;ns; k = 1;2;:::;na,
in order to maximize (A.4) subject to (A.5).
28Table 1: Speci¯cations and parameter values
Function Form Description
~ b(s;a) c1 log(a) ¡ c2a Reward under no occurrence
vp(s) Constant Post-event value
¸(s;a) min
©
1;¸0 + (1 ¡ ¸0)e±(s¡a¡sc)=(s¡a)ª
Survival probability
Parameter Value Description
¯ 0.9434 Discount factor =1/(1+0.06)
® 2.20967 Recharge dist. parameter
µ 187.077 Recharge dist. parameter
¢s 50 MCM Di® between consecutive states
ns 21 Number of admissible states
¢a 50 MCMY Di® between consecutive actions
na 15 Number of admissible actions
¢x 50 MCMY Di®e between consecutive recharge
nx 26 Number of recharge points
c1 300 £ 106 Demand parameter
c2 0:2 £ 106 Unit supply cost
vp ¡3 £ 1010 Forgone bene¯t due to occurrence
sc 300 MCM Critical stock (at red line)
¸0 0:5 Survival prob at s = 0 (black line)




































































Figure 1: Lake Kinneret's recharge series during 1932 - 2008. The descriptive
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Figure 2: The gamma distribution with parameters ® = 2:20967 and µ =
187:077 (solid) and the empirical distribution (dots) of the Kinneret's recharge

















































Figure 3: The optimal stationary Markov extraction policy '¤(s) (MCMY)
for s = 0;50;100;:::;1000. The data are reported to the right of the ¯gure and
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Figure 5: Long run (steady state) probabilities.
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